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Mark Heerema*

Uncovering the Presumption of Factual
Innocence in Canadian Law: A Theoretical
Model for the "Pre-Charge Presumption of
Innocence"

The presumption of innocence has long been regarded as a hallmark of our
justice system. Rhetoric abounds and finding a more celebrated legal doctrine is
difficult. For most in the legal profession, the presumption of innocence represents
the procedural requirement that the Crown prove all elements of an offence. Yet,
aside from its procedural and evidentiary protections, does the presumption of
innocence offer any protection at the pre-charge phase of the criminal justice
process? Specifically, for the majority of Canadians who have never been, or
never will be charged with an offence, does the presumption of innocence offer
any protection?
Regrettably, Canadian law fails to explain how the presumption of innocence
animates the pre-charge phase of the criminal justice system, but rather contents
itself merely to assert its relevance. The following paper offers a theoretical
conception of the "pre-charge presumption of innocence". In an attempt to
demonstrate its application and relevance, this theoretical model will be applied
to an emerging technique of police investigation known as the DNA sweep.
La pr6somption dinnocence a longtemps et6 consideree comme une marque
distinctive de notre systeme judiciaire. Les trait6s abondent et il est difficile de
trouver une doctrine juridique plus celebre. Pour la plupart des disciples de
Themis, la presomption d'innocence impose . la Couronne I'exigence procedurale
de prouver tous les el6ments d'un delit. Mais, mises part les protections aux
chapitres de la procedure et de la preuve, la presomption d'innocence offret-elle quelque protection, dans le processus de justice p6nale, avant le dep6t
des accusations? Plus pr6cisement, la presomption d'innocence protege-t-elle
la majorit6 des Canadiens qui n'ont jamais dte accuses d'un ddlit ou qui ne le
seront jamais?
Malheureusement,les lois canadiennes n'expliquentpascomment la presomption
d'innocence intervient dans le processus de justice penale avant le depot des
accusations, se contentant plut6t d'en affirmer la pertinence. L'article qui suit
presente une conception theorique de la presomption d'innocence avant le dep6t
des accusations. Dans une tentative d'en demontrer I'applicationet la pertinence,
ce module theorique sera applique a une nouvelle technique d'enquete polici~re
appelde - DNA sweep (collecte generale d'ADN).
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Introduction
By necessity the criminal justice system is a site in society where
the fundamental balance between state powers and respect for individual
liberties must continually be negotiated.' In a society marked by rapid
technological change, the criminal justice system in Canada must often
re-strike this balance. Consider for example the rampant proliferation
of police investigative techniques; from fingerprints, to polygraphs, to
breathalyzers, to wiretaps, to heat sensors, to satellite imagery to DNA
sweeps, police investigative techniques continue to evolve, forcing the
criminal justice system to address their propriety.
By adopting legal doctrines (e.g., the reasonable expectation of
privacy, arbitrary detention, the principles of fundamental justice, etc.) the
criminal justice system aims to provide a normative basis for drawing an
appropriate line between state and individual interests. Perhaps the most
celebrated legal doctrine in maintaining this balance is the presumption of
innocence. 2
Most legal systems conceptualize the presumption of innocence as
being the right of an accused to be considered innocent until the state has
proven their guilt in a court of law.3 This conception of the presumption
of innocence is constitutionally protected under Canadian law by s. 11 (d)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 Section 1 (d) of the
Charter provides procedural and evidentiary safeguards to an accused
after a charge has been laid against them. However, if the presumption
of innocence as protected by s. 11(d) of the Charteronly applies "postcharge," so to speak, a very basic question arises: does the presumption
of innocence, as a broader principle, have any relevance to individuals
prior to being charged with an offence? Put differently, what value is the
1. Re Laporte and The Queen (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 651 at 661-662 (Que. Q.B.) where Hugessen
J. aptly described this aspect of the criminal justice system as follows:
The criminal law has always had to strike the precarious balance between the protection
of society on the one hand and the protection of the rights of the individual members of
such society on the other.
2.
Thomas A. Cromwell, "Proving Guilt: The Presumption of Innocence and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" in William H. Charles, Thomas A. Cromwell & Keith B. Jobson eds.,
Evidence and the Charterof Rights andFreedoms (Toronto: Butterworths, 1989) 125 at 125, where it
is stated, "[flew principles have inspired such eloquent expression."
3.
Peter Brett, "Strict Responsibility: Possible Solutions" (1974) 37 Mod. L. Rev. 417 at 432:
The rule that no man should be required to prove his innocence is common to most, if not
all, civilized legal systems. It can be found in the Bible, Greek law, Roman law and canon
law as well as in the common law, and has been said to be required by reason, religion,
and humanity.
4.
CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms [Charter],s. 11(d):
Any person charged with an offence has the right
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.
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presumption of innocence to the random Canadian citizen not charged
with an offence?
Remarkably, while numerous decisions have asserted that the
presumption of innocence has an omni-present status in the criminal justice
process and protects citizens at the pre-charge stage, it is almost impossible
to ascertain any operational content to these claims.5 Consequently, the
most that can be said about the presumption of innocence at the pre-charge
phase of the criminal justice system is that it is relevant, but beyond this,
its actual function has escaped articulation.
The following discussion aims to provide a theoretical basis for how
the presumption of innocence applies at the pre-charge stage of the criminal
justice process. The theoretical model advanced in this paper holds that the
"pre-charge presumption of innocence" embraces a normative commitment
to view that all citizens are entitled to be presumed factually innocent of
a crime until there exists information to the contrary. The correlative
protections arising from this presumption rest on a simple premise: citizens
presumed to be factually innocent are entitled to be treated as if they are
innocent of the crime.
Accordingly, police investigative techniques that are inconsistent
with how a factually innocent person can expect to be treated in Canadian
society will violate the pre-charge presumption of innocence. Under the
theoretical model advanced below, increasingly invasive police techniques
are only permissible as the police progressively rebut the presumption of

5.
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly asserted that the presumption of innocence
constitutes an animating principle throughout the criminal justice process. See, e.g., R. v. Pearson,
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 320 at para. 31:
This operation of the presumption of innocence at trial, where the accused's guilt of an
offence is in issue, does not, in my opinion, exhaust the operation in the criminal process
of the presumption of innocence as a principle of fundamental justice.
Further, see R. v. S.(R.J.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451 at para. 231 where the Court states,
Although an individual might freely choose to co-operate in his own investigation, the
right to silence and the presumption of innocence require that his refusal to co-operate
could almost never be held against him at his own trial.
Examples of lower courts following suit include R. v. Kooktook, [2004] 10 W.W.R. 186 (Nun Ct. of J).
where at para. 24 it is stated,
By making a demand that required the suspects to bring tusks in to the wildlife office,
the investigating authorities had effectively assumed control over the movement of the
suspects. This therefore had the effect of engaging a full range of common law and
constitutional legal protections underpinning the presumption of innocence and the right
against self-incrimination.
R. v. Carty (1995), 31 C.P.R. (2d) 303 (Ont. Ct. of J.) at para. 39,
The question regarding whether Mr. Carty possessed drugs at that moment is clearly
asked for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements or evidence from the citizen.
Although it follows on the heels of Mr. Carty's admission that he is on probation for
trafficking, and to that extent might be seen as a logical follow-up question, it clearly
offends against the presumption of innocence.
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factual innocence through incriminating information linking an individual
to the commission ofan offence. Consequently, the pre-charge presumption
of innocence effectively calibrates the acceptable level of state power used
by the police in the course of their investigations. The model assumes that
the basic relationship between incriminating facts and justifiable exercises
of state powers can only be deviated from in exceptional circumstances.
In an attempt to demonstrate the application of this model, this paper
will scrutinize the increasingly frequent use of "DNA sweeps" in Canada.
Typically used where police have no significant leads, except for some
genetic material left at a crime scene, DNA sweeps involve the police
requesting members of the community to volunteer DNA samples. Those
requested to volunteer samples are those deemed by the police to have
had the physical opportunity to commit the crime; for example, all males
between the ages of fifteen and forty who live within a two-kilometre
radius of the crime scene.
By collecting DNA samples, the police hope to match one of the
volunteered samples with the sample found at the crime scene. While
partaking in a DNA sweep is technically a "voluntary" decision,
participation in many respects is the product of the "lesser-evil" as citizens
who refuse to "volunteer" a sample face increased police surveillance and
find themselves subject to heightened suspicion.
Following a discussion of the pre-charge presumption of innocence,
this paper will examine the propriety of DNA sweeps in light of the model
6
advanced below.
I. The pre-chargepresumption of innocence
1. Background: distinguishinglegal innocencefrom factual innocence
Fully appreciating the presumption of innocence and how it relates to the
use of state powers first requires an understanding of what is meant by
the word "innocent." When using the word innocent it is imperative to
distinguish between the concepts offactual innocence and legal innocence.
While self-evident, beingfactually innocent implies that the individual did
not in fact commit the crime, whereas being legally innocent implies that
the person has not been found guilty of the offence charged in a court of
law.

6.
For an excellent review of the use of DNA evidence, and the practice of DNA sweeps in Canada
see Neil Gerlach, The Genetic Imaginary: DNA in the Canadian Criminal Justice System (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 2004). With respect to the propriety of DNA sweeps the author makes the
following claim at 11:"DNA sweeps of entire communities have thrown the presumption of innocence
into question."
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A poignant example of innocence, in both its factual and legal sense,
can be seen in the recent Cecilia Zhang investigation. Following an
exhaustive and lengthy investigation into the brutal murder of this young
girl, Peel Regional Police detained a suspect. During the ensuing press
conference the residing Police chief held a picture of the suspect-turned
accused and made the following statement:
This is not just a murderer,
this is the most despicable of criminals, this
7
is a child murderer.
The preceding statement was roundly criticized as being contrary to the
"presumption of innocence." 8 The objectionable aspect of this statement
was the premature labelling of this accused as a "murderer." The right to be
presumed legally innocent guarantees that a person will not be labelled as
a criminal until they have been proven to be one in a court of law pursuant
to s. 11(d) of the Charter.I Therefore, the accused in the Cecilia Zhang
investigation is entitled to be considered legally innocent of this crime up
and until the Crown has proven otherwise in a court of law.
The Cecilia Zhang investigation is also instructive in how it relates to
the concept of factual innocence. It is important to note the lack of criticism
levelled against the 24-hour detention of this accused. Considering that
pursuant to s. 11(d) of the Charterthis individual is as legally innocent as
any random bystander, it is important to reflect on how the justice system
condones his detention.
The answer to this dichotomy-on the one hand condemning the
practice of labelling an accused as a "murderer," while on the other hand,
accepting his detention-is so obvious that its significance is easy to miss.
His detention is justified because thefacts obtained by the police suggested
that this individual was not innocent. On the facts his innocence is no
longer presumed, but rather seriously questioned.
Undeniably, the Canadian justice system abhors the detention of
random bystanders. However, in contrast to the random bystander, for
whom there are no facts suggesting a lack of innocence, our acceptance
of the detention of a suspect or an accused may be justified in light of the
incriminating information linking them to the commission of an offence.
The Cecilia Zhang investigation helps demonstrate how "innocence"
has both a factual and a legal aspect. Fundamental to understanding the
7.
8.

9.

Jason Botchford "Chief 'over the line"' Toronto Sun (23 July 2004).
Ibid. Eddie Greenspan offered the following denunciation:
The man charged is entitled to the presumption of innocence. It's actually in our constitution
but I guess the chief doesn't know that...
I may be too old to have my jaw drop but it was
quite a remarkable statement to be made by the chief law officer in Peel.
Supra note 4.

Uncovering the Presumption of Factual Innocence

broader legal doctrine of the presumption of innocence is the recognition
that both meanings of the word deserve to be addressed.
Despite the presumption of innocence most commonly being associated
with placing the evidentiary burden on the Crown to prove all elements of
an offence beyond a reasonable doubt, this procedural requirement does
not exhaust the broader principle,
This operation of the presumption of innocence at trial, where the
accused's guilt of an offence is in issue, does not, in my opinion, exhaust
the operation in the criminal process of the presumption of innocence as
a principle of fundamental justice.... The fact that it comes to be applied
in its strict evidentiary sense at trial pursuant to s. 11(d) of the Charter, in
no way diminishes the broader principle of fundamental justice. 0
Being presumed legally innocent, as protected by s. 11 (d) of the Charter
reflects our commitment to procedural fairness."
However, the presumption of innocence additionally reflects our faith in
humanity; it reflects our commitment to view citizens as being law-abiding
in the absence of incriminating information. 12 Where no incriminating
evidence exists to the contrary, the presumption of innocence embodies
the Canadian justice system's normative commitment to conceptualize
citizens as being presumed factually innocent.
Conceptualizing the broader presumption of "innocence" then
requires giving attention to both the legal and factual presumptions. Being
presumed legally innocent is constitutionally recognized in s. 11 (d) of the
Charter which reads as follows:
Any person charged with an offence has the right
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law
in a
3
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal'
The landmark Charterdecision of R. v. Oakes is the leading authority on s.
11(d). In Oakes the operation of the presumption of legal innocence was
described as follows:

10. Pearson, supra note 5 at para. 31. For a similar statement showing that the presumption of
innocence may also operate at investigative stage see again S.(R.J.), supra note 5.
11. R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320 at para 13, "It is one of the principal safeguards which seeks
to ensure that no innocent person is convicted."
12. R. v. Oakes (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) at 333-334:
The presumption of innocence confirms our faith in humankind; it reflects our belief
that individuals are decent and law-abiding members of the community until proven
otherwise.
13. Supra note 4.
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The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and
human dignity of any and every person accused by the State of criminal
conduct ....

It ensures that until the State proves an accused's guilt

beyond all reasonable doubt, he or she is innocent.
This is essential in a
4
society committed to fairness and social justice.1
When referring to s. 11(d) it is preferable to refer to the "post-charge
presumption of innocence." This nomenclature signifies that along a
spectrum of the criminal justice process, the protections of s. 11 (d) arise
only after an individual has been charged with an offence. The presumption
of legal innocence contained within s. 11 (d) is evidentiary and procedural
in nature, which by extension renders it of little relevance to the pre-charge
stage of the criminal justice process.
The presumption of innocence in its factual sense is a commitment to
consider that citizens are law abiding without information indicating the
contrary. This presumption occupies a much subtler role in Canadian law.
Rather than being constitutionally recognized, the presumption offactual
innocence appears to operate at a more tacit level, serving to animate the
operation of other pre-charge legal doctrines. 5
It is preferable to refer to the presumption of factual innocence as the
"pre-charge presumption of innocence." This nomenclature denotes that,
unlike the post-charge presumption of innocence which is a safeguard for
those charged with an offence, the pre-charge presumption of innocence
primarily protects citizens in the pre-charge phase of the criminal justice
process.
What follows is an attempt to provide a theoretical conception of
the pre-charge presumption of innocence. In doing so attention must be
paid to three characteristics: (1) the nature of the presumption of factual
innocence contained within the pre-charge presumption of innocence; (2)
the protection offered by the pre-charge presumption of innocence; and
lastly, (3) when the protections offered by the pre-charge presumption of
innocence are rendered inoperative.
2. The nature of the presumption offactual innocence containedwithin
the pre-chargepresumption of innocence
Before illustrating how the pre-charge presumption of innocence can serve
to regulate the use of state powers it is imperative to further examine the
nature of the presumption of factual innocence contained within the precharge presumption of innocence.

14. Supra note 12.
15. How the pre-charge presumption of innocence undergirds other legal doctrines will be surveyed
below in Part 1.3.

Uncovering the Presumption of Factual Innocence
a. All citizens initially presumed to be factually innocent
The foundation of the pre-charge presumption of innocence embodies
the normative commitment contained within the criminal justice system to
presume that random bystanders 6 are factually innocent.
The presumption of innocence confirms our faith in humankind; it
reflects our belief that individuals are decent and law-abiding members
of the community until proven otherwise. 7
Conceptualizing citizens as innocent in the abstract captures the essence
of the pre-charge presumption of innocence; in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, all citizens have the right to be considered factually innocent
of criminal involvement.
b. The rebuttable or reducible nature of the presumption offactual
innocence
The pre-charge presumption of innocence is a "presumption" in the true
sense of the word. As the police begin to gain incriminating information
linking an individual to a crime, the presumption of factual innocence
weakens.
Consider the following series of hypothetical events. Picture an
anonymous person walking down the street. In the absence of information
linking her to the commission of a crime, the pre-charge presumption of
innocence ensures that she is presumed factually innocent of criminal
involvement. Now, assume that the police have observed that she is
in possession of a stolen watch. Effectively, this information begins to
rebut the presumed factual innocence of this individual. Further, suppose
that the police have now located a witness claiming to have observed
this woman emerge from the watch store with the watch in hand. This
additional information again serves to further question her factual
innocence. Finally, assume that the police have now obtained surveillance
footage showing the woman stealing the watch. The consequence of such
incriminating information effectively upsets the presumption that she is
factually innocent.
The above progression represents a simple proposition contained
within the pre-charge presumption of innocence: the more incriminating
information that is gained, the less likely one is actually innocent. This
characteristic renders the pre-charge presumption of innocence as being
"reducible." Simply put, as incriminating information increases, the

16. That is, individuals for whom the state has no information linking them to the commission of an
offence.
17. Supra note 12.
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presumption of factual innocence within the pre-charge presumption of
innocence reduces.
Admittedly, there is something unsettling about conceiving the precharge presumption of innocence as being reducible. To do so puts it in
direct contrast with the post-charge presumption of innocence. Bearing
in mind that perhaps the true value of the post-charge presumption of
innocence is the entitlement to retain a presumption of legal innocence
until formal disposition (and is, so-to-speak, completely irreducible until
then), conceptualizing the right to a presumption of factual innocence as
reducible is a departure from its post-charge counterpart.
Nevertheless, support for the reducible nature of the pre-charge
presumption of innocence can be seen in other prominent pre-charge legal
protections which similarly become diluted in the presence of incriminating
information.
c. Other "reducible" pre-chargelegal doctrines
i. Reasonable expectation ofprivacy
Pursuant to the Charterall citizens are given the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure.1 This right has primarily been interpreted
to protect a reasonable expectation of privacy, or a "right to be left alone."' 9
Yet, this right to be left alone is tempered by the acknowledgement that
the police are not expected to leave people alone who they think, or know,
have committed crimes. Accordingly, the case law demonstrates a basic
relationship: as the police increasingly link a particular person to a particular
crime their right to be left alone correlatively begins to decrease.
Legally, this relationship manifests itself in how a reasonable
expectation of privacy corresponds to the level of incriminating information
the police have against an individual. The reasonable expectation of
privacy, like the pre-charge presumption of innocence, changes according
to each situation.2 °
For example, consider the privacy expectations of prisoners. The
Supreme Court of Canada has held that prisoners hold a significantly
reduced expectation of privacy.21 Binnie J. in R. v. Tessling noted that in

18.

Supra note 4, s.8.

19. See, e.g., Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and Research) v.
Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [Hunter]. Note in Hunter the Court made it explicit that s. 8 may
protect further interests than privacy, and indeed, in R. v. S.A.B., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678 the Supreme
Court indicated that s. 8 also protects the principle against self-incrimination.
20. R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R.432.
21. See, e.g., Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 where at para 5 La
Forest J. for the court noted that the security of the institution, the public and indeed the prisoners
themselves warranted a "substantially reduced level of privacy."
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the range of possible expectations of privacy, prisoners are at the furthest
2
end of the spectrum. 1
Yet, even before a conviction or a charge is entered, privacy remains
responsive to the likely state of guilt or innocence. In R. v. Beare the
Supreme Court of Canada offered the following:
It seems to me that a person who is arrested on reasonable and probable
grounds that he has committed a serious crime, or a person against whom
a case for issuing a summons or warrant, or confirming an appearance
notice has
been made out, must expect a significant loss of personal
23
privacy.
Accordingly, as the police begin to link an individual with the commission
of an offence, their right to expect privacy diminishes. Therefore, the
presence of incriminating evidence reduces one's reasonable expectation
24
of privacy.
ii. Arbitrary detention
Similar to the reasonable expectation of privacy, "arbitrary detention"
offers less protection as increasingly incriminating information comes to
light.
The power to detain will be considered arbitrary if there are "no criteria,
express or implied, which govern its exercise."" The practical implication
is that police may only detain citizens where there is a reasoned foundation
apparent on the facts to do so. 26 Accordingly, whether a detention is
arbitrary depends on the presence of incriminating facts.
Illustrative of this relationship is the random stopping of motor vehicles,
an issue addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Dedman, Hufsky
and Ladoceur trilogy.2 7 In these decisions the court was clear that random
stops were arbitrary as in all cases there was no information linking the
detained drivers with a driving offence prior to the stoppages. Where no
incriminating information is present, a detention will be arbitrary.

22. Tessling, supra note 20 at para 22.
23. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 413.
24. See also Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Restrictive Trade PracticesCommission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 at 508:

This alone would entitle the citizen to expect that his or her privacy would be invaded only
when the state has shown that it has serious grounds to suspect guilt.
25. R. v. Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 at 623.
26. Regina v. Iron (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 157 at 177 (Sask. C.A.).
27. In R. v. Dedman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2. The Supreme Court deemed the Ontario R.I.D.E. program
to be "arbitrary" but nevertheless upheld it under the common law. In Hufsky, supra note 25 the
Supreme Court held that random fixed police check points violate s. 9. In R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 1257 the Court held that roving random stops violate s. 9. It should be noted that in Hufsky
and Ladouceurthese violations were saved under s. I of the Charter,an issue to be addressed further
in this paper.
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Conversely, where the police have specific information linking a
particular individual with the commission of an offence, their detention
will generally not be considered arbitrary. For example, where reasonable
grounds are present, numerous forms of detention will be considered nonarbitrary including being arrested, being subject to a search warrant and
being fingerprinted.
Where information amounts to a reasonable suspicion, but not
reasonable and probable grounds, the right to be free from arbitrary
detention exists in a reduced form. As illustrated in R. v. Mann, when
the police are in possession of information amounting to a reasonable
suspicion, they may detain for limited purposes.28 The ability to detain
in Canadian law without violating the doctrine of arbitrary detention
depends on the state of police knowledge: from no grounds, to reasonable
suspicion, to reasonable grounds, what is considered to be an arbitrary
detention varies accordingly.
Both the reasonable expectation of privacy and the concept of an
arbitrary detention demonstrate that the strength of their protections are
responsive to the level of incriminating facts linking an individual with
a particular offence. As the police discover increasingly incriminating
evidence, the entitlement to be left alone diminishes as does the likelihood
that a subsequent detention will be considered arbitrary. Accordingly, by
conceptualizing the presumption of factual innocence contained within the
pre-charge presumption of innocence as being reducible, it is consistent
with other prominent legal doctrines in Canadian law.
d. The presumption offactual innocence may be totally rebutted
Brought to its logical end, the pre-charge presumption of innocence may
be so weakened that it fails to hold any presumptive value; conclusive
information linking an individual to the commission of an offence may
completely rebut the presumption of factual innocence.
Despite sounding revolutionary this statement should actually be quite
unsurprising. First, it is important to recall that pursuant to s. 11(d) of the
Charterthe individual is still presumed legally innocent. The presumption
of legal innocence remains irreducible and can only be upset after the Crown
has proven all elements of the offence against the individual in a court of
law. Consequently, even where the police have obtained the "smoking
gun," the accused is still guaranteed an unblemished presumption of legal
innocence with its correlative procedural and evidentiary safeguards.
Secondly, many of our legal doctrines are expressly premised on
construing individuals as not being factually innocent. Consider for
28.

R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59.
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example, the right against self-incrimination contained within s. 7 of the
Charter. On a very basic level, the factually innocent are in no danger of
incriminating themselves. Protecting the right against self-incrimination
is tacit recognition that some individuals are not, as a matter of fact,
innocent of the crime being investigated, and thus do have the potential to
incriminate themselves.
The pre-charge presumption of innocence embodies the normative
commitment to conceptualize individuals as entitled to an initial presumption
of factual innocence. The entitlement to be presumed factually innocent
of a crime only diminishes in the face of information which links that
individual with the commission of an offence. As the information becomes
more incriminating, the less an individual is presumed to be factually
innocent. Axiomatically, in the absence of incriminating information, the
presumption of factual innocence exists undiminished.
3. The protection offered by the pre-chargepresumption of innocence
a. The relationshipbetween the presumption offactual innocence and
state powers
The protections offered by the presumption of factual innocence rest on
a basic premise: people who are innocent should be treated as if they are
innocent, and people who are not innocent are not entitled to be treated as
if they are. Accepting the preceding premise as true renders the following
conclusions inescapable: all citizens who are factually innocent must
be treated as if they are factually innocent; all citizens whose factual
innocence has been questioned may be treated as if their factual innocence
is in doubt; and all citizens whose factual innocence has been rejected may
be treated as if their factual innocence has been rejected.
Accordingly, whenever the police conduct an investigation, the twostep inquiry demanded by the pre-charge presumption of innocence is as
follows:
(1) what is the level of factual innocence afforded to the individual
subject to the investigation; and
(2) are the state powers used in the investigation exercised in a manner
which is consistent with the level of factual innocence afforded to
the individual?
The nature of the inquiry assumes the existence of a predictive relationship
between factual innocence and permissible state powers. As being
factually innocent forms a starting point for all citizens, where police
have no information that would question the innocence of an individual,
their investigatory powers must reflect how an innocent person should be
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treated. As an example, subjecting a random bystander to a search or
an interrogation is fundamentally at odds with conceptualizing them as
factually innocent.
Only once the police gain information questioning the factual
innocence of an individual do their powers of investigation increase. As
more incriminating information is discovered, more intrusive and more
invasive forms of investigation are jusified. Case law demonstrates
that investigations can be intrusive and invasive in different respects.
While traditionally bodily and territorial integrity have been recognized,
interference and invasion can also relate to privacy interests associated
with personal information such as genetic information.2 9
Admittedly, the infinite number of police investigatory tactics renders
it difficult to articulate how one is to determine what is permissible
according to the degree to which the presumption of factual innocence has
been rebutted. With respect to this concern, the pre-charge presumption of
innocence looks to and relies on the existing jurisprudence and legislation
for guidance.
Applying the model to a hypotheticalfact scenario
A hypothetical example may bear witness to the practical implications of
this inquiry. Consider that in a new effort against the war against drugs,
the police have decided to install drug monitors in all public toilets. The
first step in the analysis is to determine the level of factual innocence
afforded to those subject to this investigatory technique. On the facts of
this example the following question would be asked: do the police have
any information which can reduce the presumption of factual innocence
for random users of public toilets?
The second step in the analysis is determining whether this type of
investigative technique is consistent with how factually innocent citizens
can expect to be treated in Canadian society. This step of the inquiry will
look at a number of sources, for example: what fact threshold is normally
required to obtain a bodily fluid sample under the Criminal Code; do we
usually afford innocent citizens a privacy interest in public toilets; are
there informational interests worthy of protecting in the excreted bodily
fluids, etc.
The right to the pre-charge presumption of innocence requires that the
police not exceed their powers. Accordingly, the pre-charge presumption
of innocence as a legal doctrine prevents unjustifiable uses of state powers
29. See e.g., R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 at 428 where the Supreme Court of Canada discusses
the three zones of privacy: personal, territorial and informational; see also R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R.
281 where the Supreme Court of Canada states there is an inherent privacy interest in controlling
personal information relating to oneself.
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in the investigative stage. While novel in articulation, there is nothing
unique about the existence of a relationship between incriminating facts
and state powers. Indeed, this basic relationship can be seen to animate
other pre-charge doctrines.
b. Exploring the relationship between incriminatingfacts and state
powers in other legal doctrines
i. Privacy
The ability of the police to invade one's privacy is not static but rather
dependent on the facts of each case.30 As a general rule the more
incriminating facts the police have against an individual, the more they
will be allowed to intrude their privacy. Equally true is the converse: the
fewer incriminating facts, the less power to invade one's privacy.
Consider for example the warrant provisions contained within the
Criminal Code of Canada. At a basic level, as the intrusiveness of the
desired search increases, more incriminating facts will be needed for its
authorization.
Illustrative of one end of the spectrum are ss. 492.1 & 492.2 of the
Criminal Code authorizing tracking warrants and number recorders. 3'
Both of these measures require "reasonable grounds to suspect" that an
offence has been committed and that assisting information would be found.
Installing a tracking device or a number recorder are relatively innocuous
and un-intrusive investigative measures, reflected in the relatively low fact
threshold needed for their authorization.
In the middle of the spectrum are the search warrant provisions found
in s. 487 of the Criminal Code. These provisions allow a broad search
power provided that there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that there
is evidence relating to a past or future crime. Reasonable grounds to
believe that relevant evidence may be collected marks an increase from
"reasonable grounds to suspect," which reciprocally reflects the increased
level of intrusion and invasion possible.
At the far end of the spectrum are examples like DNA warrants which
authorize the collection of genetic materials for forensic DNA analysis.32
The ability to obtain bodily samples with as "much force as necessary"
bespeaks a very significant and intrusive state power. Correspondingly,

30.

E.g., S.A.B., supra note 19 at para. 40:
The taking of bodily samples can involve significant intrusions on an individual's privacy
and human dignity... [T]he extent to which there is such an intrusion will depend on the
circumstances.
31. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 492.1 (1) & 492.2(l).
32. Ibid., s. 487.04. See also S.A.B, supra note 18 where the constitutionality of this scheme was
upheld.
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the threshold requirements are more stringent. Amongst the additional
requirements are "reasonable grounds to believe... that a person was a
'33
party to the offence.
The warrant provisions in the Criminal Code are more complicated
than reviewed above, however, on a basic level they can be seen to honour
a reciprocal link between the intrusiveness of state powers and the level of
34
incriminating information linking an individual with an offence.
ii. ArbitraryDetention
As noted above, the pre-charge presumption of innocence holds there to be
a relationship between the existence of incriminating information and the
permissible level of police powers. This basic relationship can also been
seen in the doctrine of arbitrary detention; the ability to detain an individual
increases as the police further link that person with the commission of an
offence.
The starting point is that individuals are entitled to be free from
detention by the police. In his dissent in Ladouceur,Sopinka J. strenuously
noted that the police have no power to detain a random bystander without
having any reason to do so. 35 There is no justification for stopping an
innocent person unless there is information specifically linking them with
a crime.
The ability to detain increases as incriminating facts arise. The
existence of this reciprocal progression is especially apparent in the concept
of investigative detentions for limited purposes. When the police have
reasonable grounds to suspect a person was involved in criminal activity, the
police are authorized to detain them for "investigative" purposes. 36 While
not authorizing a broad power of detention, the doctrine of investigative
detention attempts to provide very limited and circumscribed powers to
reflect the reality that there is information linking this individual to a
crime, despite the fact that there are not reasonable and probable grounds.
Investigative detentions symbolize a regulated middle ground.
As alluded to above, once the police have gained information
amounting to reasonable grounds our justice system enables various forms

33. Ibid., s. 487.05(1)(c).
34. This basic relationship can also be seen in warrantless searches. As an example, when
contemplating the appropriateness of searches of varying degrees of intrusion at international borders,
it is the level of incriminating facts which governs. See, e.g., R. v. Monney, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652 at
para. 38:
In other words, the more intrusive the search, the greater the degree of constitutional
protection required in terms of the standard of suspicion or belief which must be met prior
to subjecting a traveller to a search by customs officers.
35. Ladouceur,supra note 27 at 1265.
36. Mann, supra note 28.
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of detention, including the principal power of arrest. The more robust
detention powers attaching to reasonable grounds support the premise that
police powers are linked to the presence of incriminating information.
c. Does the pre-chargepresumption of innocence offer merely
duplicative protection?
If the relationship between incriminating facts and the use of state powers
forms the substratum of other pre-charge legal doctrines, does the precharge presumption of innocence merely offer duplicative protection? For
example, ifbeing detained by a police officer on a purely discretionary basis
violates the right to be free from an arbitrary detention, is it necessary to
talk about the pre-charge presumption of innocence? Similarly, to subject
a random bystander to a highly intrusive and invasive search is contrary to
their right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The question
becomes: is there any value in declaring that such actions additionally
violate the pre-charge presumption of innocence?
Conceptualized pursuant to the explanatory model offered above,
the pre-charge presumption of innocence may in fact offer duplicative
protection. Nevertheless it remains worthwhile to distinguish its operation.
Illustrative of this need is the increase in investigative technology.
Technology is becoming more accurate, less intrusive, and increasingly
more attractive to advance state interests in crime control. The net effect is
that increases in technology may be able to diminish the operational value
of some of our existing doctrines.
Consider arbitrary detention. "Detention," as a descriptor, has
been given a wide interpretation by the Supreme Court. In Therens the
Supreme Court was willing to extend "detention" to include the concept
of psychological detention. 37 But could such a broad principle enfold the
use of cameras that determine alcohol content in the blood stream? Or
consider the rapidly increasing field of pheromones: soon DNA samples
may not be needed, but rather the police may be able to match scents
without ever needing a blood sample.
Technology grows increasingly sophisticated. Where our legal fictions
have cracks, technology will fill them: detention, without actually being
detained; invasions of privacy which are not invasive; self-incrimination
by emitting smells, skin, hair, images, prints, tracks, heat images, etc.
The pre-charge presumption of innocence as a legal doctrine is not easily
circumvented by technological change in the same manner as these other
legal doctrines. It rests on the normative and philosophical commitment
that Canadians are deemed to be presumed factually innocent and entitled
37.

R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
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to be treated accordingly-changes in technology have no bearing on this
commitment.38
While the pre-charge presumption of innocence may, in operation,
duplicate protections offered by other legal doctrines, it does provide
a distinctive form of protection not expressly covered by other legal
doctrines.
4. When are the protections offered by the pre-chargepresumption of
innocence inoperative?
The reciprocal relationship between the pre-charge presumption of
innocence and state investigatory powers outlined above is intended to
represent the normal balance between state and individual interests.
However, occasionally there exists pressing state interests that courts
and governments are willing to upset the reciprocal relationship outlined
above. One need not look any further than our post-9/11 world to see how
fighting terrorism has vindicated the use of pre-emptive state investigatory
powers in certain instances.
Where state interests of sufficient magnitude exist, state investigative
powers may not bear a direct relationship with the presumption of factual
innocence contained within the pre-charge presumption of innocence.
Effectively, there may be no factual basis to reduce an individual's precharge presumption of innocence and yet the police will still be granted
measured investigative powers. For example, being subject to radar
detection and a frisk search is not consistent with how a factually innocent
person is normally treated, and yet, in the context of an airport, such
powers are considered justifiable.
Accordingly, in every analysis under the pre-charge presumption of
innocence a third inquiry must be added. Therefore, the analysis now
becomes:
(1) what is the level of factual innocence afforded to the individual
subject to the investigation;
(2) are the state powers used in the investigation exercised in a manner
which is consistent with the level of factual innocence afforded to
the individual; and

38. The normative commitment contained within the pre-charge presumption of innocence cannot
be circumvented by technological advances. In this respect, this characteristic of the pre-charge
presumption of innocence mirrors the rationale for holding that polygraph results are inadmissible. In
R. v. Beland, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 at 404 the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly held
that polygraphs are inadmissible, not because of their technological frailties, but rather because they
unjustifiably usurp the role of the court to assess credibility. Analogously, advances in technology
have no bearing on the role of the court to assess credibility, just as advances in technology have no
bearing on the justice system's commitment to treat innocent people as innocent.
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(3) if the state powers are inconsistent, are there exceptional state
interests which would justify their use?
What follows are two prominent exceptions to the normal relationship
between state powers and the presence of factually incriminating
evidence.
a. The drinking and driving exception
As noted above, in Dedman,Hufsky and Ladouceurrandom police stops of
vehicles were held to violate the right to be free from arbitrary detention.
Those conclusions accord with the basic relationship outlined above: in the
absence of information collected by the police linking a particular driver
with an offence, permitting police officers to stop random vehicles would
usurp the initial starting point that an individual is considered factually
innocent and entitled to be treated accordingly. Simply put, drivers who
are, in the absence of contradictory information, factually innocent of any
driving related offence should not be subject to a roadside stop.
Nevertheless, in Dedman, Hufsky and Ladouceur the random stops
were ultimately considered acceptable. In justifying the constitutionality
of these practices the Supreme Court of Canada focused on the cumulative
effect of two rationales. First, the court noted that the nature of driving
offences makes it impractical to form reasonable grounds; merely observing
a passing vehicle cannot provide police with an opportunity to gain useful
information. 9 The nature of the activity makes it nearly impossible for
the police to rebut the presumption of factual innocence. Secondly, the
court noted the prevalence of drinking and driving and its consequences,
"incurable terminal traged[ies]," "a depressing picture of ... killing and
maiming," and "carnage." 4 0 The alarming consequences of drinking and
driving and the difficulty in its detection justify stopping random vehicles
in Canadian law.
Despite how these factors operate to provide exceptional circumstances
granting unusual police powers in the drinking and driving context, the
combination of difficulty in detection and dreadful consequences does not
amount to a general exception. Consider the state interest in curtailing
crime and drug use in high crime areas of society. As a matter of
statistics, police can pinpoint and locate high crime areas. Despite the
high statistical probability of crime, police are not permitted to regulate
the entrance to these areas, insist on pat-downs and searches, etc. In R. .v.

39. Hufsky, supra note 25 at 535-536.
40. Ladouceur, supra note 27 at paras 1279-1281. The employment of such strong rhetoric may
provide insight into the degree of justification required to allow pre-emptive state investigative
powers.
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Mann, lacobucci J. for the majority explicitly rejected this notion, stating
that "the high crime nature of a neighbourhood is not by itself a basis for
detaining individuals.

41

In R. v. Mellenthin the Supreme Court of Canada further illustrated
the narrow scope of the "drinking and driving" exception (and conversely
the strength of the basic relationship). At issue in Mellenthin was the
propriety of an officer searching a gym bag located in the passenger seat
of vehicle after it had been stopped at a police check-point. After reaffirming the drinking and driving exception which permitted police to
stop random vehicles, the court held that this exception did not permit
other pre-emptive state powers.
However, the subsequent questions pertaining to the gym bag were
improper. At the moment the questions were asked, the officer had
not even the slightest suspicion that drugs or alcohol were in the
vehicle or in the possession of the appellant. The appellant's words,
actions and manner of driving did not demonstrate any symptoms of
impairment. Check stop programs result in the arbitrary detention of
motorists. The programs are justified as a means aimed at reducing the
terrible toll of death and injury so often occasioned by impaired drivers or
by dangerous vehicles. The primary aim of the program is thus to check
for sobriety, licences, ownership, insurance and the mechanical fitness
of c ars. The police use of check stops should not be extended beyond
these aims. Random stop programs must not be turned into a means of
conducting either an unfounded general inquisition or an unreasonable
42

search.

Mellenthin clearly re-enforces the vitality of the reciprocal relationship
between state powers and the factual presumption of innocence,
[n]onetheless, the violation must be considered a serious one. It was
grounded on any
conducted as an adjunct to the check stop and was not
43
suspicion, let alone a reasonable and probable cause.
b. Internationalborders-thenational security exception
The exercise of state powers at international borders provides a further
example where courts and legislatures have been prepared to deviate from
the reciprocal relationship between incriminating information and the
powers of the police.
International borders present an exception to this basic relationship
by justifying disproportionately high levels of state powers. For example,
where reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement in normal conditions
41.
42.
43.

Mann, supra note 28 at para 47.
R.v. Mellenthin, [1992]3 S.C.R. 615 at 624.
Ibid., at 630.
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would entitle police to exercise a limited power to detain for investigative
purposes,44 reasonable suspicion at a border crossing will justify a more
robust repertoire of state powers. Consider for example, the ability of the
police to conduct strip searches.
In a non-border context, strip searches are only permissible if the state
can demonstrate that there are reasonable and probable grounds justifying
the necessity of the search. Further, in normal circumstances strip searches
are considered so intrusive that they form an exception to the normal
4
"search incident to arrest" rule.

1

At international borders strip searches are permitted merely on a basis
of reasonable suspicion. The constitutionality of this lower-than-normal
threshold was upheld in Simmons and Monney, and justified on the weighty
concern that "the security of Canada's interior is engaged."46 Dickson C.J
in Simmons captures the essence of the exception as follows:
The dominant theme uniting these cases is that border searches lacking
prior authorization and based on a standard lower than probable cause
are justified by the national interests of sovereign states in preventing the
entry of undesirable persons and prohibited goods, and in protecting tariff
revenue. These important state interests, combined with the individual's
lowered expectation of privacy at an international border render border
searches reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In my view, the state
interests enunciated throughout the American jurisprudence that are
deemed to make border searches reasonable, are no different in principle
from the state interests which are at stake in a Canadian customs search
for illegal narcotics. National self-protection becomes a compelling
component in the calculus.47
In considering both the drinking and driving and international border
exceptions, it becomes evident that the predictive relationship between the
pre-charge presumption of innocence and the investigatory powers of the
police is subject to exceptional circumstances.
It is important to recognize the types of situations where courts will
permit deviations to the basic relationship between state powers and
factual innocence. The examples outlined above are not exhaustive of this
class, but merely illustrative. Also deserving of note is the degree to which
courts have confined and restrained the creation of exceptions in deference
to the general rule. The judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada with
respect to both the drinking and driving exception and the international
border exception demonstrate a lot of "heavy lifting" and a conscious
44.
45.
46.
47.

Supra note 28.
R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679.
Monney, supranote 34 at para. 34. See also Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. 1, s. 98.
R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 at 527-528.
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attempt to narrow the exceptions. For example, in Mellenthin the court
restricted the drinking and driving exception from becoming a new, and
more liberal search tool of the police; similarly, the international border
exception permitting liberal search powers is restricted to occasions when
Canada's national security is engaged.
Accordingly, there are exceptions to the basic relationship between
the pre-charge presumption of innocence and the use of state investigatory
powers. However, these exceptions are narrow in scope, and do not
threaten the general application of the basic relationship.
II. Pre-chargepresumption of innocence and DNA sweeps
The preceding explanatory model aims to clarify the operational content
of the presumption of factual innocence contained within the broader
presumption of innocence. Referred to as the "pre-charge presumption of
innocence," the value and utility of this legal doctrine should be measured
by its ability to assist in the analysis of the fact patterns which the criminal
justice system must address daily. To demonstrate the application of the
pre-charge presumption of innocence as a legal tool, it will be applied
to a new and highly controversial form of police investigation: the DNA
sweep.
1. The practice of DNA sweeps
Effectively, DNA sweeps are large scale processes of elimination.4"
Seductively simple in concept, they are typically used when police
have obtained genetic material deposited at a crime scene which they
believe came from the perpetrator but have no other leads to guide their
investigation. The genetic material is first analyzed to gain a DNA profile.
Once this profile is attained, police attempt to determine the class of
individuals who had the physical opportunity to commit the offence. A
review of police practice in this regard shows no real guidance for how
this class is determined, as DNA sweeps can vary significantly in their
breadth.49 An example of criteria may be: white males aged eighteen to
forty with a residence within five kilometres of the crime scene.
Once the sweep-list criteria are settled on, all individuals fitting
the description are approached and asked to volunteer a genetic sample

48. For an excellent definition of DNA sweeps see Jeffrey S. Grand, "The Blooding of America:
Privacy and the DNA Dragnet" (2001-2002) 23 Cardozo L.Rev. 2277 at 2277 note 1 where he
describes the practice as follows:
The mass collection of biological samples from individuals whom the police have no
reason to suspect committed the crime under investigation. These samples are used to
create DNA profiles that are compared to the profile of the perpetrator.
49. Past examples have shown DNA sweeps to be as narrow as male employees of a small company
to an entire community.
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for DNA testing. All samples are then analyzed for a DNA profile and
compared with the DNA profile found at the crime scene.
Those individuals who refuse to provide a sample will be subject to
increased surveillance. 0 The increased surveillance ultimately serves the
dual purpose of gaining any possible non-genetic information linking this
individual to the crime, but more importantly, to circumvent the lack of
consent by gaining materials which may contain genetic information for
profiling (e.g., a discarded pop can or a cigarette butt).
Currently, DNA sweeps remain unregulated by legislation and to date
their propriety has not been the subject ofjudicial commentary in Canada.
Nevertheless, DNA sweeps are being used with increasing frequency in
both the United States of America5' and Canada.52 Recent examples of
their use in Canada include both the Holly Jones and Cecilia Zhang murder
investigations.53
The reception to DNA sweeps has been mixed. Some laud it as highly
efficient, effective and desirable:
[A]dvocates support the use of large-scale DNA sweeps. They contend
the practice saves time and effort by quickly eliminating large numbers of
potential suspects, leaving police free to concentrate on more promising
leads. 4
Others characterize DNA sweeps as threatening basic individual liberties:

50. As Grand, supra note 48, asserts "any individual who declines to volunteer a sample falls under
the heightened scrutiny of the police - his refusal alone arouses police suspicion..."
51. Numerous articles have reviewed the use of this practice in the United States of America: Grand,
supra note 48; Fred W. Drobner, "DNA Dragnets: Constitutional aspects of Mass DNA Identification
Testing" (1999 - 2000) 28 Capital U. L. Rev. 479; Jonathon F. Will, "Comment: DNA as Property:
Implications on the Constitutionality of DNA Dragnets" (2003 - 2004) 65 U. Pitt L. Rev. 129; & Mark
Hansen, "DNA Dragnet" (May, 2004) 90 ABA Journal 38.
52. Academic commentary of the use of DNA sweeps in Canada is more limited. See Ricardo G.
Federico & Vincenzo Rondinelli, "The Genetic Witness: Mass DNA Testing" PDNA: Pushing the
Envelope -DNA Articles and case comments (I May 2000) (QL); Vincenzo Rondinelli, "The DNA
Dragnet: A Modem Day Salem Witch Hunt?" (2003) 10 C.R. (6th) 16.
53. Melissa Leong & Michelle Shephard, "Cecilia case sparks privacy worries DNA sampling called
rights issue: Investigation third in a year to use it" Toronto Star (January 4, 2004); Alison Dunfield &
Kirk Makin, "DNA sweep in Toronto alarms many" Globe and Mail (May 25, 2003).
54. See Hansen, supra note 51 at p. 4 3. For a Canadian endorsement of the practice see Jeff White,
"A new way to catch killers: In an era of coddled criminals, DNA sweeps help even the score"
NationalPost (18 June 2004) A-20 where the author states,
The unfortunate thing is not that Toronto police have done three DNA sweeps in the last
two years, but that this tactic wasn't available in 1984 to catch the killer of Christine Jessop
and exonerate wrongly accused Guy Paul Morin before his 10-year nightmare had even
begun.
Use of DNA sweeps may escalate if other police forces decide they balance, to some small
extent, the Charter sections that have made "getting away with murder" the rule rather than
the exception.
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[C]riminal defense and civil libertarians decry the practice, which they
say is overly broad and seldom, if ever, truly voluntary. They also
question its effectiveness, and worry about what will happen to the DNA
samples once the donors have been eliminated as suspects.5
DNA sweeps potentially raise many legal issues such as the reasonable
expectation of privacy, the principle against self-incrimination, consent,
etc. While these legal issues remain outside the scope of this analysis, do
DNA sweeps violate the presumption of innocence?
2. DNA sweeps and the presumption of innocence
a. DNA sweeps and the presumption of legal innocence, or the "postchargepresumption of innocence"
The post-charge presumption of innocence as contained within s. 1 (d)
of the Charter protects the right of all citizens to be presumed legally
innocent of a crime until the Crown has proven otherwise in a court of law.
The protections offered by s. 11 (d), which are procedural and evidentiary
in nature, appear to have little relevance to the practice of DNA sweeps.
Due to the fact that those on the sweep-list have not been charged with an
offence, it remains difficult to see how the protections offered by s. 11 (d)
pertain to these individuals.
b. DNA sweeps and the presumption offactual innocence, or the "prechargepresumption of innocence"
The pre-charge presumption of innocence protects the right of all
citizens to be free from state powers which are inconsistent with their
level of innocence as apparent on the facts. Accordingly, the precharge presumption of innocence restrains the police from engaging in
investigative measures which are inconsistent with the imputed factual
innocence of each individual. Deciding whether DNA sweeps infringe the
pre-charge presumption of innocence requires the following inquiry:
(1) What is the extent to which the presumption of factual innocence
for those on the sweep-list has been rebutted before the DNA sweep
is conducted;
(2) Are DNA sweeps consistent with the extent to which the presumption
of factual innocence has, or has not been rebutted; and
(3) If DNA sweeps are deemed excessive, are there any state interests
present to justify deviation?
55. See Hansen, supra note 51 at 43. For a Canadian admonishment of these practices see Allison
Dunfied & Kirk Makin, "DNA sweep in Toronto alarms many" Globe and Mail (25 May 2003) where
Canadian law professor Sanjeev Anand is quoted as stating "Make no mistake, it is a form of stateimposed coercion."

Uncovering the Presumption of Factual Innocence

(1) To what extent has the presumption of factual innocence been
rebutted for those on DNA sweep-lists?
The issue at this stage of the analysis with respect to DNA sweeps becomes:
to what extent have the police been able to rebut the presumption of
factual innocence through information linking these individuals with the
commission of the offence under investigation?
Those subject to a DNA sweep have an extremely loose factual
relationship to the offence being investigated. Their inclusion is based on
mere opportunity alone, that is, citizens who physically had the opportunity
to commit the offence.56 Mere opportunity is not a standard of suspicion
or belief which can reduce an individual's pre-charge presumption of
innocence to any degree. Accordingly, those on a DNA sweep-list, without
more than "mere opportunity" linking them to the offence, are entitled to
a virtually unreduced presumption of factual innocence.
(2) Are DNA sweeps inconsistent with a virtually unreduced presumption
of factual innocence?
The pre-charge presumption of innocence protects citizens from being
subject to state powers that are inconsistent with the extent to which their
presumption of factual innocence has been rebutted. The issue at this
stage of the analysis becomes whether DNA sweeps are consistent with
a virtually unreduced presumption of factual innocence. At a practical
level this question asks: if we really believe that the citizens on a DNA
sweep list are, on the facts, innocent of the crime being investigated is it
appropriate to subject them to a DNA sweep?
It can be safely stated that citizens, whom we believe to be innocent
of the crime being investigated, are not expected to volunteer a DNA
sample for profiling. To hold that this form of investigation is defensible
requires accepting that in Canadian society it is permissible to have all
potential perpetrators prove their innocence.57 Rejecting this form of state
power is conceptually similar to why after a robbery all citizens in the
neighbourhood are not asked to come down to the police station and provide
an alibi. Asking for alibis and genetic samples are not repulsive in every

56.
57.

Drobner, supra note 51 at 485.
See, e.g., Federico & Rondinelli, supra note 52 where the authors echo this conclusion:
While authorities have maintained that a main purpose of mass DNA testing has been
to eliminate possible suspects, the practice seems to spread a wider net than claimed.
Rounding up a town's citizens to prove their innocence threatens the basic tenet of our
administration of justice and democratic state. Many will argue that the inconvenience
caused to a few individuals in order to apprehend a serial rapist is a small price to pay. The
authors however, echo Ben Franklin in saying, "Those who would give up their Liberty for
a bit of temporary safety, deserve neither Liberty, nor safety."
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circumstance, but at a minimum they demand some factual foundation
linking those asked to the commission of the offence. Asking innocent
citizens of Canada to clear their names is inconsistent with how our justice
system operates; a mere physical opportunity to commit a crime is not a
fact-based threshold recognized in Canadian law as justifying increased
state powers, such as a DNA sweep.
It is instructive to focus on the level of incriminating information
which may justify asking individuals for a DNA sample. Perhaps the best
evidence of what Canadian society feels to be acceptable can be seen in the
DNA warrant provisions in the Criminal Code, "reasonable and probable
grounds to believe.., that a person was a party to the offence."58 Notably,
the level of incriminating information needed to sustain this level of belief,
far exceeds information suggesting a mere physical opportunity to commit
an offence.
(3) Do state interests exist to justify DNA sweeps as an exceptional use of
state powers?
In the presence of exceptional circumstances the basic relationship
between state powers and the presumption of factual innocence may be
upset. As noted in the case law, to do so places a heavy onus on the state
as courts have zealously guarded against unbalanced state powers. While
the drinking and driving and international border exceptions appear to be
well entrenched, they are not exhaustive of when this basic relationship
may be circumvented.
With respect to DNA sweeps, potential interests which may allow
their pre-emptive use are the need for efficiency and the existence of an
otherwise unsolvable crime.
(i) Efficiency
When police are faced with numerous potential suspects, DNA sweeps have
an ability to exonerate suspects in a highly efficient manner. Undeniably,
there is administrative appeal to this aspect of DNA sweeps. Nevertheless,
ourjustice system is not solely driven by efficiency. In addition to efficiency
and crime-control measures, Canada's justice system is equally concerned
with respecting the liberty, freedom and dignity of Canadian citizens.5 9 To
accede only to the goal of efficiency would by logical extension endorse
measures such as cameras on street corners, DNA samples given at birth,
implanted tracking devices, etc. The criminal justice system represents

58.
59.

Supra note 31 at s. 487.05
Re Laporte, supra note 1.

Uncovering the Presumption of Factual Innocence

469

a balance, and therefore the goal of efficiency cannot be pursued in an
unbridled fashion.
The pre-charge presumption of innocence has a forceful normative
answer for why we as individuals do not have to go to the police station
every time a crime is committed. While the desire to control crime is
noted, our justice system equally protects the ability of individuals to
be treated as innocent and to enjoy basic liberties and freedoms. The
price of this balancing of interests may sacrifice "effective and efficient"
policing, however, our system is not guided merely by these state interests.
Upsetting this balance and subjecting individuals to heightened state
powers is exceptional and reserved for exceptional circumstances.
(ii) Inability to solve crime
The inability of police to otherwise solve a crime is often marshalled
as a justification for using DNA sweeps. It invokes a form of "but-for"
logic: but for DNA sweeps there are crimes which may go unsolved.
This reasoning is familiar as the Supreme Court of Canada did rely on the
inability to catch drinking and driving offences without allowing police to
detain random vehicles.
The strength of this argument likely depends on the nature of the crime
being investigated. First, what crimes would not meet the requisite level?
Consider where the police retrieve a stolen purse with a hair on it, and yet
have no other leads. While the state has an interest in stopping property
offences, it does not meet the level of sufficiency as would be required to
set aside the predictive relationship. In other words the desire to solve a
crime of this nature is likely insufficient to displace the normal balance
between state and individual interests - a conclusion amply supported by
the case law. 60 The difficulty in solving a crime is not, in and of itself, a
6
recognized exception for increasing state powers. 1
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See, e.g., R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903 at 938-939 where Lamer J states as follows:
It is a deeply ingrained value in our democratic system that the ends do not justify the
means. In particular, evidence or convictions may, at times, be obtained at too high a price.
This proposition explains why as a society we insist on respect for individual rights and
procedural guarantees in the criminal justice system. All of these values are reflected in
specific provisions of the Charter such as the right to counsel, the right to remain silent,
the presumption of innocence and in the global concept of fundamental justice. Obviously,
many of the rights in ss. 7 and 14 of the Charter relate to norms for the proper conduct of
criminal investigations and trials, and the courts are called on to ensure that these standards
are observed. The principles expressed in the Charter obviously do not emerge in a legal,
social, or philosophical vacuum. With respect to criminal law in particular, the courts
have, throughout the development of the common law and in the interpretation of statutes,
consistently sought to ensure that the balance of power between the individual accused
and the state was such that the interests and legitimate expectations of both would be
recognized and protected.
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However, at the other end of the spectrum are more reprehensible
offences, such as murder and sexual assault. Arguably, the consequences
of these offences are just as deplorable as the "maiming" and "carnage"
caused by drinking and driving. Consider the example of an elusive serial
murderer in a small town. A serial murderer represents not only the reality
of past crimes but also a continuing threat to the safety of citizens. It is
conceivable that in such situations the use of police powers such as a DNA
sweep may be appropriate.
However, the difficulty with permitting the use of DNA sweeps for
"serious" offences is its indeterminacy. Accordingly, perhaps the best place
for the exceptions to be enumerated is in an amendment to the Criminal
Code. For example, the warrant provisions for DNA forensic analysis
contained with in the Criminal Code are limited to certain designated
offences .6 Restricting the use of DNA sweeps to these exceptional
circumstances would provide much needed guidance and certainty to
these practices.
The practice of DNA sweeps premised on the mere physical
opportunity to commit a crime violates the pre-charge presumption of
innocence. Asking citizens to provide a DNA sample for forensic analysis
in these situations is inconsistent with the use of state powers against a
Canadian citizen who maintains a virtually unreduced presumption of
factual innocence. While DNA sweeps conceivably may be utilized in
exceptional circumstances, there should be a heavy onus on the police to
justify their propriety.
Conclusion
Just as the criminal justice system is not exclusively concerned with the
eradication of crime, it is also not exclusively concerned with the protection
of individual liberty interests. The criminal justice system is concerned
with both. In Canadian society it is called upon to strike a difficult balance
between these two interests which often diverge: trumping state interests in
controlling crime can impair the rights and liberties of citizens; trumping
the rights and liberties of citizens can diminish the ability of the state to
effectively control crime. As noted above, the inherent tension between
these interests manifests itself in the practice of DNA sweeps. DNA
sweeps represent a common dilemma of balancing state and individual
interests.
To mediate between these competing interests and settle on an
appropriate balance, the criminal justice system invokes legal doctrines for
guidance. The "pre-charge presumption of innocence," as conceptualized
62.
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above, represents a novel addition to existing doctrines. To date the
presumption of innocence, as a legal doctrine, has not been operationally
defined for the pre-charge phase of the criminal justice process. While
courts have asserted that the presumption of innocence is relevant
throughout the entire criminal justice process, they have thus far failed to
explain how it relates to citizens not charged with an offence.
While novel in its articulation, the pre-charge presumption of innocence
does share a fundamental characteristic with other pre-charge doctrines.
Common to the doctrines of "reasonable expectation of privacy" and
"arbitrary detention," the pre-charge presumption of innocence maintains
a basic relationship between the level of incriminating facts, and the
acceptable level of police powers.
Nevertheless, despite having this common thread with other pre-charge
legal doctrines (which, admittedly may result in duplicative protection),
the pre-charge presumption is worthy of independent status in lieu of its
distinct normative foundation. The normative foundation, which states
that innocent citizens are entitled to be treated as innocent, is a premise
which has legal utility on its own. It is a premise which cannot be diluted
by increases in technology or advances in investigative capabilities.
For example, conceivably the police may soon be able to match genetic
samples through scent technology, and thus not need to detain. So while
there may be no "detention" or no reasonable expectation of privacy in
abandoned smells, allowing the police to process biological information
in a criminal investigation is not consistent with how the police should act
towards a person who is factually innocent.
By expressly linking the presumption of factual innocence with
state powers in investigation, the pre-charge presumption of innocence
represents a further tool for maintaining a balance between state and
individual interests. As a model it balances both our need for effective
law enforcement and our desire to protect individual liberties.
The pre-charge presumption of innocence forces both state interests
and individual interests to accommodate each other. While not allowing
unlimited state powers in fighting crime, the model does contemplate
that there are appropriate circumstances when the police may use
invasive tactics. Rationalizing increased state powers on the premise of
incriminating information recognizes that individual liberty interests too
will need to yield at times. This calibrated relationship accords with the
sense of balance which underpins the criminal justice system.
Ultimately, the pre-charge presumption of innocence answers a
question that has escaped resolution: what relevance does the presumption
of innocence have to the majority of Canadians who have not, or will
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never be, charged with an offence? Its relevance to these Canadians is
simple: you are given the benefit of being presumed factually innocent
of criminal behaviour as a starting point. This starting point mandates
that until incriminating information begins to weaken this presumption,
the state is constrained to use powers which are consistent with how a
Canadian who is legally andfactually innocent of a crime can expect to be
treated. The pre-charge presumption of innocence protects this reciprocal
treatment, justifying deviations only in exceptional circumstances.

